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ATTORNEYS: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE HELD INAPPLICABLE TO PREVENT
DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT APPRAISAL REPORT PREPARED
FOR ESTATE TAX RETURN
THE Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McKay,1
refused to hold the attorney "work product" doctrine of Hickman
v. Taylor2 inapplicable to investigations conducted by the Internal
Revenue Service, but it nevertheless determined that an expert's
appraisal report is not protected as work product. Pursuant to section
7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, which empowers the Service "to
examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material" in "ascertaining the correctness of any return,"3
the Commissioner had summoned the estate's attorney to produce an
appraisal report which concerned the value of property owned by
a corporation in which the decedent was a stockholder. The attorney
resisted the summons, claiming that the report was protected by the
attorney-client privilege or by the work product doctrine since he
had hired the experts and requested the report in anticipation of
estate tax litigation. The court of appeals reversed the district
court's refusal to enforce the summons4 and held that neither the
attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine justified non-
disclosure of the report.
The attorney-client privilege, which protects from discovery the
confidential communications between the attorney and his client,5
does not encompass the communications of experts to the attorney
even though they concern the client.6 However, the work product
1372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See generally 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24 (2d ed.
1950); Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Privi-
lege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part II), 42 U. DEf. L.J. 253 (1965).
a INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. See generally Burroughs, The Use of the Admin-
istrative Summons in Federal Tax Investigations, 9 Vi.L. L. REv. 371 (1964).
' INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 7604 (a) (district court jurisdiction for summons en-
forcement). See generally Burroughs, supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950); 8 WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
6 See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963); In the Matter of Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
In the Matter of Blumenberg, 191 F. Supp. 904, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 4 MOORE, op.
cit. supra note 2, 26.24, at 1528; Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's
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doctrine, which seeks to encourage adequate trial preparation, 7 may
prevent discovery of an expert's report when the expert has been
hired by the attorney as his agent to aid in the preparation of
anticipated litigation.8 As originally formulated in Hickman v.
Taylor," however, the doctrine merely protects the work of the
attorney. The extension of the doctrine to subsume the work
performed by the attorney's expert has been criticized by both
courts10 and commentators," who have opposed any impediment
to discovery. Aside from this expanded interpretation of Hickman,
a notion of fairness to the party who hired the expert has also been
used to justify a denial of discovery,1 2 especially when the informa-
tion is readily available for independent evaluation. 3 However, if
the movant can establish "good cause" for discovery by demonstrating
Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962); Gardner, Agency Problems in the
Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: The Expert Witness, 42 U. DrT. L.J. 473, 476-80
(1965). But see San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 373
P.2d 448, 23 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1962).
See, e.g., Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Privilege
and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part 11), 42 U. DET. L.J. 253, 268-82
(1965).
a See, e.g., Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 967 (1950); Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23
F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959); United States v. 7534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D.
Ga. 1954); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 876, 378 (D.N.J. 1954); Scourtes v.
Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., supra note 7, at 58-59; Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Janas,
13 F.R.D. 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1953).
See generally Friedenthal, supra note 6, at 469-79; Long, Discovery and Experts Under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111 (1965); von Kalinowski, Use of Dis-
covery Against the Expert Witness, 40 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (1965); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1032 (1961).
'329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947). See, e.g., Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of
Attorney-Client Privilege: Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery
(Part 1), 42 U. DET. L.J. 105, 137 n.138 (1964).
20 See, e.g., United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 413-15 (N.D. Cal.
1965); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963); Gulf
Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 24 F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D. Tex. 1959); United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 236 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
z2 E.g., Friedenthal, supra note 6, at 472-73; Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law
of Attorney Client Privilege: The Expert Witness, 42 U. DET. LJ. 473, 487-89 (1965);
Long, supra note 9, at 139-42; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv.
940, 1031-32 (1961). But see Hochman & Salkin, Attorney-Client Privilege in Criminal
Tax Cases, 43 TAXES 182, 184 (1965).
12 E.g., United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596-97 (D. Md. 1963);
4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 2, 26.24, at 1523. See generally Friedenthal, supra note
6, at 479-88; Long, supra note 8, at 130-39.
. '*E.g., United States v. 7534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954);
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Colonial Airlines,
Inc. v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 914
(2d Cir. 1953).
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that the expert's report is essential to his case and otherwise unavail-
able to him,' 4 neither the work product doctrine nor any notions of
fairness will foreclose discovery. 15
The Internal Revenue Service has argued that neither the
attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine is ever
applicable to summonses issued incident to its investigations,8
apparently because the statutory grant of power is broad and limited
only by a relevancy requirement. 7 The courts, however, have
refused to adopt this absolute approach.' While the scope of the
attorney-client privilege in tax investigations has been sufficiently
defined to exclude therefrom documents prepared by an expert even
though they relate to the client, 9 the corresponding breadth of the
work product doctrine is obscure. Indeed, the work product defense
can rarely be raised, because the material sought by the Service is
usually related to the preparation of the tax return, as opposed to
the anticipation of tax litigation, and is thus beyond the definitional
extent of the doctrine.20 Accordingly, prior to the instant case the
courts have not been compelled to decide whether they will follow
the expansive interpretation of the Hickman rule which comprehends
the work of experts performed for the attorney.2' Contributing to
" See, e.g., United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal.
1965); Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 263-
64 (D. Neb. 1959); 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, 26.24, at 1531-52. See generally
Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Privilege and
"Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part I), 42 U. DET. L.J. 105, 126, 129, 139-65
(1964).
25 E.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954).
26 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 926 (E.D. Ky. 1962). See 8A
MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 47.51 n.3.2 (Supp. 1966).
'
7 See note 3 supra and accompanying text; e.g., United States v. First Natl Bank,
173 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
1' See In the Matter of Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United
States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
19 See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 US. 951 (1963); United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965);
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But cf. United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.
1961); Brauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338, 342-44 (D.N.D. 1966). See generally Lofts,
The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 TAx L. REv. 405
(1964).
20 See Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 951 (1963); In the Matter of Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
21 But see Reisman v. Caplin, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81722, 81724 (D.D.C. 1961) (nar-
row interpretation of Hickman rule by implication; no reasons given), aff'd on other
grounds, 317 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1963), af'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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this general uncertainty surrounding the application of the work
product doctrine in a tax investigation context is the apparent
statutory authorization of a relevancy test to establish discoverability
rather than the usual good cause standard.22 The statutory guide
has been liberally construed to allow discovery of reports which
merely "throw light upon" the subject of the investigation,2 3 and
concurrently the courts have appeared hesitant to require the Service
to show "good cause" as well.2" However, if good cause is not read
into the statute, a work product challenge becomes superfluous, for
the question of relevancy is always in issue because of the statutory
language25 whether or not a work product challenge is involved.
The court in McKay disposed of the attorney-client privilege
by reasoning that this privilege protects communications between
the attorney and his client and not those between the attorney and
third parties. Although the court challenged the applicability of the
work product doctrine in tax investigations,26 it avoided a determina-
tion of that question by holding that the appraisal report could not in
any event be protected by the work product doctrine.2 This con-
clusion was reached without any discussion of the cases which express
an expansive view of Hickman v. Taylor.28 The court merely noted
that the qualified doctrine as stated in Hickman applied only to work
done by the attorney2 and then observed that the report in the in-
stant case had been prepared by the expert alone.30 Having thus ex-
cluded the work product challenge, the court held the report dis-
coverable on the basis of the relevancy criterion as interpreted by
the regulations.8 1
By adopting a narrow view of the Hickman rule, the McKay
2*See note 3 supra and accompanying text; United States v. Carey, 218 F. Supp.
298, 299 n.5 (D. Del. 1963); United States v. First Natl Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716, 719-20
(W.D. Ark. 1959).
28 Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 860 U.S. 912
(1959); In the Matter of Commissioner, 216 F. Supp. 90, 93-94 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
21 In the Matter of Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
28 372 F.2d at 176.
27 Id. at 176-77.
28 See cases cited note 8 supra.
293 72 F.2d at 176-77.
30Id. at 177.
"1 Ibid., quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (f) (2) (1958): "Complete financial and other
data upon which the valuation is based should be submitted with the return, including
copies of reports of any examinations . . . made by . . . experts as of or near the
applicable valuation date."
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court did not have to decide whether the work product concept
applies to tax investigations. Perhaps the reluctance of the court
to apply the doctrine may be explained by the assumption that
acceptance of the doctrine would have required the addition of
"good cause" to the statutory test of relevancy. Inasmuch as the
tax investigation has been compared to the inquisitorial power of
the grand jury32 and as such is not entirely analogous to pre-trial
discovery, this addition may not be justified.33 However, the work
product doctrine would give a qualified protection only to reports
prepared in anticipation of litigation, while all material used in
assembling the tax return would pre-exist the investigation and
thereby fail to qualify as work product; thus, acceptance of the
doctrine would not seriously impede investigations. Moreover,
adequate trial preparation should presumably be protected and
encouraged for tax litigation as well as for other areas. Therefore,
the work product doctrine should be recognized when the Service,
even in the context of an investigation, seeks material prepared by
the attorney or his agent solely in anticipation of litigation. While
McKay has not precluded the chance for a work product claim in
tax investigations, it has clearly indicated that the Fifth Circuit
prefers a narrow interpretation of the Hickman doctrine. Other
courts could, however, follow the expansive view which McKay
ignored, but to do so would force a decision on the applicability of
the doctrine to tax investigations. Until a court is willing to make
this decision, the scope of the doctrine will remain uncertain.
S See Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953). See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
3s See 872 F.2d at 176.
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